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Abstract:
This work focuses on: (1) understanding the impact of sinkhole attacks on tree-
based routing topologies in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), and (2) investigating
cryptography-based strategies to limit network degradation caused by these attacks.
This work is particularly important as WSN protocols that construct a fixed routing
topology may be significantly affected by malicious attacks. Furthermore, considering
networks deployed in a difficult to access geographical region, building up resilience
against such attacks rather than detection is expected to be more beneficial. We thus
first provide a simulation study on the impact of malicious attacks based on a diverse
set of parameters, such as the network scale and the position and number of malicious
nodes. Based on this study, we propose a single but very representative metric for de-
scribing this impact. Second, we present the novel design and evaluation of two simple
and resilient topology-based reconfiguration protocols that broadcasts cryptographic
values. The results of our simulation study show that our reconfiguration protocols
are practical and effective in improving resilience against sinkhole attacks, even in the
presence of some collusion.
Key-words: wireless sensor network, sinkhole attacks, resilience, tree-based routing
protocols
Combattre les attaques par siphon dans les protocoles
de routage en arbre
Résumé : Ce travail porte sur (1) l’évaluation de l’impact des attaques par siphon sur
les topologies de routage à base d’arbre dans les réseaux de capteurs sans fil (WSNs),
et (2) l’utilisation de stratégies à base de cryptographie pour limiter les dégradations
du réseau causées par ces attaques. Ce travail est particulièrement important car les
protocoles WSN basés sur des topologies statiques peuvent être sévèrement affectés
par les nœuds malicieux. De plus, en considérant les réseaux déployés dans les ré-
gions difficiles d’accès, les stratégies basées sur la résistance aux attaques peuvent être
beaucoup plus efficaces que celles basées sur la détection de ces attaques. Aussi, nous
décrivons d’abord une étude par simulations de l’impact d’attaques selon de nombreux
paramêtres, tels que la taille du réseau ou la position ou le nombre de nœuds malicieux.
Nous appuyant sur cette étude, nous proposons une métrique unique pour représenter
cet impact, qui capture de nombreux paramêtres. Ensuite, nous présentons deux pro-
tocoles de reconfiguration par diffusion de valeurs cryptographiques. Les simulations
montrent que ces protocoles sont pratiques et efficaces pour améliorer la résistance des
réseaux contre les attaques en siphons, même en présence de collusion.
Mots-clés : réseau de capteurs,attaque de siphon,routage en arbre
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1 Introduction
The deployment of a wireless sensor network (WSN), in general, is governed by its ap-
plication. One of the most well-known and challenging applications for WSNs is data
collection in a difficult to access geographical region, in which the network is expected
to operate for a satisfactory period of time without any intervention. In addition, a sen-
sor network is particularly prone to failures and, to be effective, it is necessary to cope
with various forms of disruptions, ranging from battery outages to malicious attacks.
To cause a disruption, the malicious attacks may not even need to be complicated. By
simply propagating false information, malicious nodes can significantly affect network
functionality, especially routing. Since malicious attacks are easy to launch, it is es-
sential and, however, extremely challenging, to understand the risk a network is under.
This constitutes the first goal of this paper.
For many applications, security (i.e., confidentiality, integrity and availability of
information) is vital to the acceptance and use of sensor networks. For instance, a large
set of routing protocols in WSNs are based on the construction of a tree-based rout-
ing topology initiated by a sink [5, 22, 23, 3, 9, 26, 14]. In particular, these protocols
use advertised information (e.g. hop count from a sink) to build a routing topology.
To understand how secure operation of these protocols is essential for the health of the
network, consider the attack, known as the sinkhole attack [8], where malicious sensors
pretend to be closer to the sinks than all their neighbors. Attracting more traffic, these
sensors can either selectively drop the received data (i.e., selective-forwarding attack)
or collect sensitive information. Clearly, the protocols that construct a routing topol-
ogy would be significantly affected by these attacks. More specifically, in Directed
Diffusion [5] and TinyOS [14], routes are established simply based on the reception
of beacon messages initiated by the sink. Hence, sinkholes are easy to create, even
without any collusion among sensor nodes, as there is no mechanism to verify the orig-
inator and the contents of the message. Therefore, combating these attacks constitutes
the second goal of this paper.
To counter these challenges, this paper first investigates the impact of sinkhole at-
tacks in tree-based routing topologies. We present a simulation study that helps to un-
derstand and, consequently, define a good representation of the impact of such attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on a general metric to represent
the impact of sinkhole attacks on the performance of tree-based routing protocols. In
particular, we investigate a number of key performance parameters (e.g., distribution,
density, positioning, attacker capability) that influence the impact of these attacks. This
is a significant challenge due to the high variability of different combinations of param-
eters. For instance, a low number of malicious nodes that are one hop away from the
sink can affect the network in the same way as a high number of randomly distributed
malicious nodes. Thus, based on our simulation study, we propose a single metric,
which we call “risk factor”, that can span these variations.
Finally, in comparison to current work [7, 18, 19, 24], this paper focuses on re-
silience against instead of detection of compromised nodes. Resilience is an important
property especially in networks deployed in environments where human intervention
is difficult. Furthermore, detection mechanisms often introduce more complexity and
so, more weaknesses to the system,which do not justify their benefits. Hence, building
up resilience may prove to be more beneficial. To this end, as our second contribu-
tion, we propose two RESIlient and Simple Topology-based reconfiguration protocols:
RESIST-1 and RESIST-0. RESIST-1 prevents a malicious node from modifying its
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advertised distance to the sink by more than one hop, while RESIST-0 does not allow
such lying at the cost of additional complexity.
Via simulations and using our risk factor metric, we studied the performance of
RESIST-1 and RESIST-0 (1) for three tree-based routing protocols (2) on a large set
of topologies (3) with different levels of vulnerability to malicious nodes. The simu-
lation results showed that our reconfiguration protocols are practical and effective in
improving resilience against sinkhole attacks. Finally, we conclude with a discussion
on implementation issues, such as the use of cryptography in sensor networks, and on
the impact of collusion on our work.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the
system model. Section 3 investigates the representation of the impact of malicious
nodes. In Section 4, we lay out our proposal for two simple and resilient topology-
based routing protocols. Performance results are presented in Section 5 and discus-
sions in Section 6. The Section 7 overviews the current literature. Finally, Section 8
concludes with future work.
2 Problem statement
We focus on sensor-based monitoring application scenarios, where accessing the mon-
itored region and/or human intervention is difficult. Therefore, we propose quantifying
and limiting the impact of disruptions caused by compromised/malicious nodes. (In
the rest of the paper, the terms compromised and malicious are used interchangeably.)
In the following, the network and threat models are presented in more detail.
2.1 Network model
We consider a connected WSN consisting of N static sensors randomly scattered on a
geographical area, and only one sink, each with unique IDs. All sensors are identical in
terms of computational, memory, and communication capabilities. In order to keep the
focus on the analysis of the functionalities of our proposals, we leave the evaluation of
energy consumption for future work. Nodes do not have access to location informa-
tion. Each node or the sink is able to communicate wirelessly with a subset of nodes
(its neighbors) that are in its transmission range, rt. We assume that for any two nodes
X and Y , if X can communicate with Y , then Y can communicate with X .
We focus on a large set of routing protocols relying on tree-based topology con-
struction [5, 22, 23, 3, 9, 26, 14]. The data is thus, routed from sensor nodes to the sink
through a tree rooted at the sink. The routing tree is an aggregation of the shortest paths
from each sensor to the sink based on a cost metric, which can represent any applica-
tion requirement: hop count, loss, delay among others. Here, the routing tree is built
by using the hop distance to the sink.
2.2 Threat model
We focus on sinkhole attacks launched by compromised nodes inside the network. In
our threat model, sensors cannot lie about their identities due to the presence of crypto-
graphic measures [20]. We further assume that malicious sensors are not colluding, i.e.
collaborating to increase the impact of the attack. The impact of collusion is discussed
in Section 6.2.
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We assume that public-key cryptographic primitives are available on all sensors
(refer to [27] for a survey on key distribution in WSNs). Furthermore, recently it has
also been shown that public key infrastructure is viable for WSNs [15]. Hence, in our
model, all sensors only know and trust the public key Ksinkpub of the sink. Additionally,
each sensor X has a pair of public-private keys (KXpub, KXpri) that it can use to prove its
identity. These key pairs can be generated and uploaded offline to the sensors before
the deployment. Using these key pairs, nodes perform authentication and sign data
messages.
3 Impact of Malicious Sensors
When assessing the performance of tree-based routing protocols, it is crucial to be able
to characterize the topology built in terms of its vulnerability to malicious sensors.
Typically, “the number of compromised sensors” is used for this purpose [7,11]. How-
ever, this metric is not necessarily indicative of the hazard that malicious nodes might
cause in a WSN: one compromised sensor close to the sink can reduce the data delivery
success more than dozens of sensors compromised at the border of the network. Intu-
itively, when tree-based routing protocols are in use, the impact of a malicious sensor
mostly depends on the number of uncompromising sensors in its sub-tree. We thus
introduce a new metric, called Risk Factor, which takes these points into account, and
encompasses parameters such as the number of compromised sensors, their position,
the density and size of the network. It provides a more accurate way to evaluate the
impact of selective forwarding and sinkhole attacks on tree-based routing protocols by
enabling the classification of different compromised topologies into a few equivalence
classes. Next, we introduce our metric, and show, through different simulations (per-
formed using a discrete event-based simulator implemented in Java), how it captures
various parameters of compromised topologies.
3.1 Risk Factor computation
We compute the “Risk Factor” of a given topology by first computing a local risk
factor for each node X , denoted as LRiskX . Essentially, LRiskX intuitively shows
the probability that a message from a node X arrives at a compromised sensor on the
path to the sink. Then, the risk factor of the whole topology can be computed as the
mean of the local risk factors of all nodes in the network.
To compute LRiskX for all nodes, we first construct the graph G(V, E), where V is
the set of sensor nodes and the sink, and E is the set of edges, (i.e. links between nodes
that can communicate directly within transmission range). Any shortest path algorithm,
e.g. Dijkstra or Bellman-Ford, can be run over G(V, E) to compute the distance to the
sink for each sensor as the minimum hop count between them. It must be noted that
the outcome of the shortest path algorithm is deterministic, unlike minimum spanning
trees created by different WSN routing algorithms. This is because the latter depends
on the order the nodes are reached during the construction phase, which can greatly
vary among separate protocol executions due to different probabilistic factors such as
collisions and wireless channel error rate.
The LRiskX of compromised nodes is selective forwarding dropping probability
p, while, LRisksink is 0, as the sink cannot be compromised. For all other nodes,
LRiskX is computed as the average of the local risk factors of all neighbors that are
strictly closer to the sink. More formally:
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LRiskX =
8>><
>>:
0 if X is the sink
p if X is malicious
P
Y ∈NX |dY <dX
LRiskY
‖{Y ∈NX |dY <dX}‖
otherwise,
(1)
where NX is the neighbor set of X , dX is its distance to the sink, {Y ∈ NX | dY <
dX} is the subset of its neighbors with a shorter distance to the sink, and ‖S‖ is the
cardinality of S. While Equation 1 does not explicitly represent the attacker capability,
except for selective forwarding probability p, the effect of different type of “distance”
attacks is captured implicitly through the use of dX . Note that the “distance attacks”,
such as the sinkhole attacks considered in this paper, mainly affect how a node per-
ceives its distance to the sink and hence, dX . We present further detail on risk factor
computation under different attacks in Section 5.
LRiskX is computed recursively starting from the sink and moving to nodes with
increasing hop counts. Given LRiskX , ∀X ∈ V , the risk factor of the entire topology,
TRisk, is:
TRisk =
P
X∈V LRiskX
‖V ‖
(2)
The strength of the proposed risk factor lies in its ability to capture the mean impact of
all the possible trees that can be created by an arbitrary routing protocol. Essentially,
the local risk factor accounts for all neighbors that are closer to the sink, and hence, it
is able to represent all the potential parents (including compromised nodes pretending
to be closer to the sink) on any tree-based routing topology.
3.2 Risk Factor pertinence
In this section, we show how our Risk Factor captures the parameters of a compromised
topology better than usual metrics. We assume malicious nodes perform selective-
forwarding attacks with p = 1. The following parameters are studied:
• Positioning of compromised nodes, which represents the distribution of com-
promised nodes in the geographic area covered by the network.
• Scale of the sensor network, which defines the number of sensor nodes and the
area the network covers.
• Number of compromised sensors
3.2.1 Positioning of compromised nodes
The distribution of compromised sensors has an important impact on their hazard. As
a rule of thumb, if the compromised nodes are closer to the sink, their effect is more
threatening since nodes that are close to the sink carry more data than nodes that are
farther. To understand how our Risk Factor takes this into account, we evaluate four
different distributions of compromised sensors (not necessarily realistic):
• Uniformly Random (UR)
• Linear (L), so that they form an imaginary line that runs through the area of the
network.
• Ring (R), so that they form a ring surrounding the sink.
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Figure 1: Risk Factor of different positioning scenarios for malicious nodes.
• Gaussian (G), so that they follow a Gaussian distribution around a center point
according to a dispersion parameter.
Fig. 1 shows that our risk factor indeed captures the impact of these distributions.
All topologies are of fixed size (500 sensors), density (3 ln 500) (as defined in [4])
and number of compromised nodes (50). All nodes are uniformly distributed in a
simulation area a2 = pirtN3 lnN (as in [2]), except the sink which is always in the center.
For each distribution, we plotted the risk factor as the distance from the sink increases:
the definition of this distance is intuitive for R, and does not matter for UR; for L,
it represents the distance from the sink to the closest (imaginary) point on the line;
finally, for G, it is the distance to the center of the distribution. Note that the distance
is normalized by the maximum distance to the side of the network area. For G, we use
the same normalization for the variance, and restrict ourselves to 0.1 and 0.5 for Fig. 1.
As expected, our risk factor is constant for UR, as this distribution does not vary
with distance. For the others, the risk factor increases when the distance decreases.
Perhaps less expectedly, the risk factor oscillates for the R distribution, which can be
explained as follows: if we represent all the nodes with the same distance to the sink
as a disk, compromised nodes on the border of the disk have a higher chance than the
ones inside of being chosen as parents by the nodes outside the disk. Hence, the risk
factor is maximum when the ring of compromised nodes is exactly at a multiple of the
transmission range (here, the transmission range is equal to 0.21 times the maximum
distance to the sink). Nevertheless, the risk factor for R still globally decreases as the
distance increases.
3.2.2 Scale of the Sensor Network
It is important to know how the safety of a network is affected depending on its scale.
For instance, networks with higher number of nodes are expected to experience less
danger compared to sparse networks for the same number of malicious nodes. There-
fore, we define the scale of a sensor network as (1) the number of sensors and (2) the
geographical area the sensor network covers. Hence, in our simulations, we evaluated
RR n° 6811
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Figure 2: Risk Factor as the scale of the network increases
two different cases when increasing the scale: (1) we kept the area of the network
constant (Area-Constant/AC deployment) and hence, increased the density by adding
more nodes, and (2) increased the area of the network proportionally to the number
of sensors (Density-Constant/DC). Furthermore, for each case, we first assumed that
the number of malicious nodes remained the same (Malicious-Constant/MC). Then,
we relaxed this assumption by scaling the adversary capability and thus, keeping the
uncompromised to compromised ratio constant (Malicious-Adapting/MA). In our sim-
ulations, in the DC deployment, the network density is 3ln(100), whereas in the AC
scenarios the network spans 95×95 meters. In MC scenarios, the number of malicious
nodes is 50. Finally, we use two MA configurations, where the ratio of malicious nodes
is 10% and 50%, respectively.
Fig. 2 depicts the risk factor for these different cases. For Area-Constant and
Malicious-Constant (AC/MC), as expected, the risk factor decreases considerably, as
the number of nodes increases, since the impact of a constant number of compromised
nodes decreases. The same argument also applies to Density-Constant and Malicious-
Constant (DC/MC). However, in the case of Malicious-Adapting (MA), the two differ-
ent deployments exhibit different behaviors. For instance, for AC, the increase in the
number of nodes is neutralized by the increase in compromised nodes. However, this
is not the case for DC. Since the transmission range is fixed, a bigger area increases
the depth of routing trees to connect nodes to the sink. So, as the number of malicious
nodes scales with the number of nodes, each malicious node has a potentially higher
impact based on the depth of the tree. The risk factor captures this difference between
AC/MA and DC/MA, as it remains constant for the former and increases for the latter.
3.2.3 Number of compromised nodes
Finally, we present how the risk factor captures the number of malicious nodes in the
network. In Fig. 3, we evaluate the risk factor for the different cases of positioning
of malicious nodes (discussed in Section 3.2.1). All topologies are networks of 512
sensors with moderate density (3ln(512)) and the transmission range rt of each sensor
is 20 m and the network is 185× 185 m.
Fig. 3 shows that the ring case (i.e., R) can cause the major damage to the network
with a relatively small number of malicious nodes, however, only at certain distances
from the sink (d). On the other hand, for both UR and G, there is no capacity constraint
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ing : L and R curves are limited by the number of malicious nodes that can be put on
the line or the ring.
on the number of malicious nodes. Hence, as the number of malicious nodes increases,
their risk factors eventually surpass the risk factor for R, where the ring is at a distance
rt from the sink (i.e., d = 1). Most importantly, Fig. 3 shows that the risk factor
increases fast until 25 − 40% of the nodes are compromised and from this point on,
the increase in risk factor is not significant. As this is what would be expected in a real
world scenario, we conclude that our risk factor metric is able to represent different
topology-related parameters and is able to distinguish their impact successfully.
4 Security protocols
To achieve higher resilience in tree-based routing protocols [5, 22, 23, 3, 9, 26, 14], we
propose two schemes to be used at the tree reconfiguration phase triggered by the sink.
Note that we do not have special constraints on the period between reconfigurations:
it can be chosen either similar to the current tree-based routing protocols or based on
cost or topology vulnerability. We define a class of RESIST-h reconfiguration protocols
that allow malicious nodes to modify their advertised distance to the sink, but no more
than h hops. Based on this definition, we introduce two protocols, RESIST-1 and
RESIST-0, which are presented in the remainder of this section. We also describe here
cryptographic operations and message contents of the proposed protocols, but refer the
reader to Section 6 for an efficient way of implementing them.
4.1 Simple reconfiguration protocol (RESIST-1)
The reconfiguration starts by the sink sending a Hello(epoch, tokens) message to all
its neighbors, where epoch is a strictly increasing timestamp, chosen by the sink and
tokens is a list of tokens [T0, T1, T2, ..., TR]. Essentially, each token is a (token number,
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epoch) pair signed by the sink:
Tk = (k, epoch)signed(Ksink
pri
), (3)
where k is the token number. When a sensor receives a Hello message, and after
verifying that the tokens are correctly signed by the sink (i.e. by using the public key
Ksinkpub ), it does the following:
• If the epoch is new, it remembers the identity of the node sending it (his parent),
and propagates the Hello message after removing the smallest token from the
list of tokens. In other words, it receives Hello(epoch, [Tk, Tk+1, ..., TR]) but
sends Hello(epoch, [Tk+1, ..., TR]).
• If the epoch is already known, but the Hello message advertises a shorter hop
distance to the sink (i.e., contains a smaller token), a selfish approach would
only update the node itself, while a gossip approach would also propagate a new
Hello message to the neighbors. In the rest of the paper, we follow the gossip
approach.
Each sensor remembers as its parent the sensor that sent it the smallest token signed by
the sink for the most recent epoch. Note that the token number of the smallest token
is also the hop distance to the sink. Alternatively, sensors can also remember all the
nodes that advertise the same distance with the smallest token for a given epoch. In
Section 5, we also evaluate this approach.
Sinkhole attack resilience: A compromised node can directly forward the Hellomes-
sage without dropping the first token. Assume that the node is the first compromised
node on the branch that the Hello message travels. Then, if the compromised node is
at distance k from the sink, its neighbors would believe they are at distance k too, and
so they would believe that the compromised node is at distance k − 1. Nevertheless,
the compromised node cannot pretend to be at a distance smaller than k − 1, because
it would be unable to provide smaller tokens than Tk. Note that as the Hello message
travels down the tree, it might encounter other malicious nodes that do not drop the
token before forwarding the message. In this case, each uncompromised sensor would
believe to be at a shorter distance to the sink depending on how many malicious nodes
exist before it (e.g., if the number of malicious nodes between the sensor and the sink is
2, then it will at most believe it is 2 hops closer to the sink than the reality). Even if we
do not have a strong bound on the deviation from the real distance in RESIST-1 (i.e.,
it increases with the number of malicious nodes on the path), this might not degrade
the performance significantly because the main impact is caused by the malicious node
closest to the sink.
4.2 Complex reconfiguration protocol (RESIST-0)
This protocol is inspired by a protocol used to measure availability in peer-to-peer
networks [10], where newly generated pairs of cryptographic keys are diffused in the
network at every round. The sink sends a Hello(epoch, [T0, T1, ..., TR]) message,
where the generated tokens are:
Tk = ((k, epoch, K
k
pub)signed(Ksink
pri
), (K
k
pri)signed(Ksink
pri
)
), (4)
where (Kkpub, Kkpri) is a newly generated pair of cryptographic keys for token k at a
reconfiguration epoch. The reconfiguration protocol is the same as RESIST-1, except
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(c) RWalk routing
Figure 4: Performance gain for different routing protocols: (a) Fixed Tree, (b) Round-
Robin with, (c) Random-Walk (n = 1)
that, at the reception of a new epoch and before choosing a sensor Y as its parent, a
sensor X challenges the sensor Y first by sending a Challenge(k, epoch) message.
Basically, this message asks Y to prove its distance k from the sink (i.e. that it has
a copy of the token Tk). Sensor Y replies with a message ChallengeReply, which
contains:
((k, epoch, Kkpub)signed(Ksinkpri ), (ID
Y , IDX)signed(Kkpri))
(k, epoch, Kkpub)signed(Ksinkpri ) is the first half of the token Tk that Y received. At the
reception of the ChallengeReply message and using the public key Ksinkpub , node X
can first verify if the token k was correctly signed by the sink. In addition, node X
recovers the public key of the token k, Kkpub. Then, it can decrypt the second part of
the ChallengeReply message, which was encrypted by the private key of token k,
Kkpri. Node X can thus verify if its identity, IDX , was correctly signed by node Y . If
so, it believes in IDY and in the Y ’s advertised distance k from the sink.
Sinkhole attack resilience: Since a sensor can sign the second part of the ChallengeReply
message, if and only if it knows the private key for the token k, it is impossible for
a compromised sensor (without collusion) to correctly reply to a Challenge. Fur-
thermore, compromised nodes cannot even carry out the attack that we described for
RESIST-1. Essentially, not dropping the smallest token would fail, because they would
not be able to respond to the Challenge for the shorter hop count. Hence, RESIST-0
provides strong resilience against sink-hole attacks. We discuss the impact of collusion
on our protocols in Section 6.
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5 Performance Evaluation
The goal of our evaluation is to measure the amount of resilience obtained by RESIST
protocols described in Section 4. To this end, we present performance results under
malicious attacks using three baseline routing protocols, described here after. The ex-
periments were run in a discrete event-based simulator implemented in Java. as we are
only interested in a RESIST’s algorithmic evaluation, our simulator uses a simplified
MAC layer, where neither message losses, nor collisions are considered. In fact, the
correct performance of the presented schemes are independent of the order of message
arrival.
5.1 Simulation Setup
This section describes the three baseline protocols and our simulation setup. We con-
sider a data collection application, where each sensor periodically sends data (e.g.,
measurements) to the sink. The routing topology to reach the sink is regularly re-
configured [14]. Malicious nodes do not generate data and they drop every received
message with probability p = 1.
In our custom simulator, we implemented three baseline routing protocols: FTree,
RRobin and RWalk. We studied the performance of these protocols in networks when
resilient reconfiguration schemes are used (RESIST-1 and RESIST-0) and not used
(vulnerable case). In our simulations, compromised nodes try to attract higher volumes
of traffic by advertising shorter paths.
In FTree, the routing tree is built once at each topology reconfiguration phase. Ev-
ery sensor forwards all its data to its parent until the next reconfiguration. RRobin dif-
fers from FTree as each sensor computes a set of alternative parents during the topology
reconfiguration. This set includes the neighbor that sent the first Hello message and
any neighbor that sent a Hello message with a hop count smaller or equal to the first
neighbor. Each time a sensor has to send a message, it selects one parent from this set
in a round robin way. In RWalk protocol, each sensor makes a random decision about
forwarding a message either over the routing tree (computed as in FTree) or forwarding
it to a randomly selected neighbor. If the message is not sent over the tree, it follows
a n-hop random walk and after n hops, it is again forwarded over the tree. The goal
of both RRobin and RWalk protocols is to allow escaping regions that may be severely
affected by malicious nodes. In all our experiments with RWalk, we use n = 1.
We generated many random topologies, progressively filling them with malicious
sensors. The space of topologies was divided in 10 buckets, where buckets 0, 1, etc.
contain the topologies whose risk factor is respectively in [0,0.1), [0.1, 0.2), etc. At
each step, the risk factor was evaluated and the topology added to the corresponding
bucket, until every bucket had at least 100 topologies. Using these topologies, the
performance gain was computed as the ratio of messages that actually reach the sink
compared to the number of messages that should reach the sink if no sensor were
compromised.
5.2 Resilient Reconfiguration Protocols
In this section, we evaluate each routing protocol separately under different levels of
vulnerability to malicious nodes. Our results show that RESIST-0 achieves signifi-
cant performance gain for all routing protocols (see Fig. 4). RESIST-1 improves per-
formance compared to the vulnerable case, but the gain is much smaller than with
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Figure 5: Using two paths (MP) instead of one increases the overall performance of the different
strategies.
RESIST-0. In general, as the risk factor increases, the performance of routing protocols
decreases. More importantly, for both vulnerable and RESIST-1 cases, this decrease is
roughly exponential, whereas for RESIST-0, it has a better, linear decrease, as it does
not allow nodes to lie about their distance to the sink.
Fig. 4 confirms that when malicious sensors are able to lie, they can attract more
network traffic and thus, incur a much higher impact in the WSN. The linear decrease
in performance of RESIST-0 seems to be the upper bound of the performance we can
obtain by only addressing the sinkhole attacks. To get better results, one must also
fight selective forwarding attacks. An attractive approach to decrease the impact of
selective-forwarding attacks is to send each message through multiple paths to the sink.
Fig. 5 shows the improvement gained by using two paths per message (one FTree path
and another RRobin path), for different resiliency levels. An improvement of 5% is
observed in all cases, except for RESIST-1 where it can reach 10%. Hence, in the
vulnerable case, even if more than two paths is used, this still would not be sufficient
to reach the performance of RESIST-0.
5.3 Routing Protocols Comparison
In this section, we compare the three routing protocols for resilient (i.e., RESIST-0 and
RESIST-1) and vulnerable cases. To make such a comparison, we also modified the
computation of the risk factor to represent the attacker capability more accurately. The
main goal of this study is to understand which routing protocol is more advantageous
among the three.
RR n° 6811
14 Papadimitriou & Le Fessant & Carneiro Viana & Sengul
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
0.90.80.70.60.50.40.30.20.10.0
R
ec
ei
ve
 R
at
io
Risk Factor (buckets)
FTree
RRobin
RWalk
(a)
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
0.90.80.70.60.50.40.30.20.10.0
N
um
be
r o
f Z
on
es
 b
el
ow
 T
hr
es
ho
ld
Risk Factor (buckets)
FTree
RRobin
RWalk
(b)
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
0.90.80.70.60.50.40.30.20.10.0
R
ec
ei
ve
 R
at
io
 o
f A
ffe
ct
ed
 Z
on
es
Risk Factor (buckets)
FTree
RRobin
RWalk
(c)
Figure 6: RESIST-0 performance evaluation: (a) Comparative performance of routing
protocols. (b) Number of severely affected zones in the network (threshold =60%). (c)
Received ratio of affected zones in the network.
5.3.1 Performance in RESIST-0 Case
The performance results with RESIST-0 is depicted in Fig. 6(a). Note that even if
sinkhole attacks are avoided, malicious nodes can still perform the selective forwarding
attack. Fig. 6(a) clearly shows that FTree and RRobin outperform RWalk. This is
expected as in RWalk, the average path length that each message travels to the sink is
longer. This consequently increases the probability of meeting a malicious node on the
path. Further experimentation on RWalk also showed that the protocol performance is
inversely proportional to n. This actually means that the best case for n-hop random
walk is achieved when n = 0, in which case RWalk is equivalent to FTree routing.
Fig. 6(a) also shows that FTree and RRobin have similar performance. This is
surprising since, intuitively, the performance of RRobin should be better compared to
FTree. Analyzing the results, we observe that, as expected, for sensors, which have ma-
licious parents, RRobin improves the performance by letting these nodes periodically
send to alternative parents. However, this does not necessarily improve overall perfor-
mance as the reverse case also holds: sensor nodes with good parents on the routing
tree use malicious nodes as parents in a round robin fashion. Consequently, any gain
from RRobin is neutralized by putting sensor nodes with good parents at risk.
To understand the effect of malicious nodes on the protocol behavior better, we
divide the network into 100 equal zones and define the failure threshold of a zone as
the percentage of data sent by the zone that needs to be dropped to qualify the zone as
poorly monitored. In reality, this threshold would depend on the criticality of the sensor
network application. We set the failure threshold as 60% in our experiments. Fig. 6(b)
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Figure 7: Comparative performance of routing protocols without any resistant recon-
figuration protocol (using Vulnerable Risk Factor).
illustrates how many zones fell below the failure threshold for each risk factor bucket
and routing protocol. Initially, the number of zones below failure threshold is higher for
FTree than RRobin. Coupled with the fact that both protocols share the same receive
ratio (see Fig. 6(c)), this means that RRobin just diffuses the effect of malicious nodes
to more zones, so that fewer zones actually fail. However, as the risk factor increases,
the number of zones below threshold increases beyond FTree due to the reverse case
appearing more often. Essentially, increasing the failure threshold moves the shift point
to the right. Nevertheless, although the number of affected zones is higher for RRobin,
the average received data ratio per affected zone still remains higher than FTree. On
the other hand, the number of failed zones in RWalk is always the highest due to its
overall poor performance.
5.3.2 Performance in RESIST-1 and vulnerable cases
To better understand the performance of RESIST-1 and vulnerable cases, we slightly
modified the computation of the risk factor presented in Section 3. The main reason for
this modification is to represent the different malicious power of compromised nodes
in RESIST-1 and vulnerable cases. Note that the only difference between the cases is
the advertised distance to the sink, the only change in the computation is the way initial
distances are calculated for each sensor. In the RESIST-1 case, since a malicious node
can only lie by one hop, its distance is equal to that of its neighbor with the smallest
distance to the sink. For the vulnerable case, malicious nodes pretend to be the sink,
and so, the distance of each malicious node is 0. Hence, the shortest path algorithm
needs to be run once for each sink, real and pretend. At the end, each node is assigned
the shortest distance sink of these runs. Hereafter, each version of the risk factor is
referred as RESIST-1 Risk Factor and Vulnerable Risk Factor, respectively.
Figs. 7 and 8 show the performance of FTree, RRobin and RWalk (n = 1) under the
RESIST-1 and vulnerable cases. For each graph, we partitioned topologies based on
their respective risk factors (i.e., RESIST-1 and Vulnerable Risk Factor). Quite different
than the RESIST-0 results (see Fig. 6(a)), RRobin performs the best for the vulnerable
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Figure 8: Comparative performance of routing protocols under the RESIST-1 reconfig-
uration protocol (using RESIST-1 Risk Factor).
case (see Fig. 7). This is because, in this case, the FTree algorithm outputs a forest of
small routing trees, where the real sink and each malicious node is the root of one of
these trees. Obviously, only the nodes that belong to the tree of the real sink can deliver
data. In contrast, since RRobin allows nodes to follow different routes to the sink, it
is able to reduce the effect of these sinkhole attacks. Note that the reverse case of
RRobin (i.e., nodes with good parents use malicious nodes as alternative parents) does
still exist. However, in the vulnerable case, the effect of fragmenting the network into
several trees with FTree is greater than the reverse case of RRobin. Such fragmentation
also occurs in RWalk, which explains why its performance is lower than RRobin as
well. Essentially, in RWalk, the routing tree is built in the same way as in FTree.
Interestingly, RRobin cannot sustain the same performance in the RESIST-1 case.
In the vulnerable case, the performance of FTree and RWalk is devastated by the frag-
mentation of the network into disconnected trees. Hence, RRobin is able to perform
better. However, note that, in RRobin, if a node receives the first Hellomessage from a
malicious node, then other neighbors may not be able to join the set of alternative par-
ents if they advertise longer distances. Hence, the set of alternative parents becomes
very small and most often consists of one malicious parent (or one of its descendants).
This problem, although it appears in the vulnerable case too, is more obviously seen
in RESIST-1 case, since FTree and RWalk can perform better in this case. Hence, in
the RESIST-1 case, all protocols perform comparably, with FTree performing slightly
better (see Fig. 8).
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the cost of using cryptographic primitives in sensors net-
works, and the impact of collusion on RESIST protocols.
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6.1 Reducing the Cost of Cryptography for Sensors
The main cost of our RESIST protocols is the size of Hello messages, which
carry multiple tokens that contain cryptographic values. Although, this might strain
the significantly resource-constrained WSNs, we believe this can be avoided by an
efficient way of implementing tokens. For instance, in [11] one-way hash functions
are used so that a token Tk+1 can be computed from a token Tk. Using this method,
Hello messages need only to contain the first and the last token, signed by the sink,
i.e. Hello(Hk(T0), (epoch, HD(T0))signed(Ksink
pri
)), where d is the diameter of the
network. On receiving this message, a sensor can find its hop-count distance k by
hashing D − k times the token Hk(T0) until it reaches HD(T0). Moreover, as it does
not know T0, and H is a one-way function, it cannot compute Hk−1(T0) and thus, it
is not able to lie more than one hop (i.e., as in RESIST-1). Furthermore, recently, [15]
showed that Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC) can be implemented at a very low
cost in WSN. ECC keys are known to be much smaller than equivalent RSA keys [12],
so that signatures and keys shorter than 110 bits would be largely sufficient in most
contexts.
6.2 The Impact of Collusion on RESIST Protocols
To be able to implement sinkhole attacks in the presence of RESIST protocols, mali-
cious sensors have to be designed to collaborate, to share good tokens (i.e., a token that
can prove a short distance to the sink) they are able to collect during reconfigurations.
Thus, RESIST protocols limit the power of collusion attacks to the closest distance
an attacker can get to the sink. Hence, malicious nodes residing at the border of the
network, for example, would not be able to disrupt it.
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Collusion is also limited by the communication capabilities of malicious sensors:
in Fig. 9, we simulated the impact of collusion when colluding sensors have normal
radio ranges and are distributed randomly on the network area. In our simulations,
malicious nodes exchange tokens so that they all appear the same distance to the sink
(i.e., the distance of the malicious node that is closest to the sink). Our results show
that the performance of RESIST-1 is not affected by the presence of colluding nodes.
This was expected, as the collusion among malicious nodes do not necessarily create
a higher impact on the structure of the tree. On the other hand, in RESIST-0, sharing
of tokens enables replying challenges for shorter distances and hence, has an effect on
performance.
Finally, the most dreadful attack would be a malicious sensor, close to the sink with
a long radio range, allowing it to propagate a very good token to malicious sensors far
from the sink. However, collusion in this case might not cause a significantly higher
degradation in performance, as the dominant impact already comes from the malicious
node closest to the sink.
7 Related work
Security in wireless networks is attracting the attention of many researchers [25] since
security is vital to guarantee correct operation of sensor protocols. Nevertheless, this is
also an extremely challenging task as it is relatively easy to launch an attack in a sensor
network due to the wireless communication medium. The main conclusion of recent
studies on secure routing is that updating current protocols with security extensions is
not sufficient and that routing protocols should be designed from scratch with security
in mind.
This paper focuses particularly on sink-hole and selective forwarding attacks. Most
other approaches against these attacks revolves around detection of malicious nodes [24,
19,11]. In [24], multi-hop acknowledgments are used to detect and blacklist nodes that
do selective forwarding attacks. However, in addition to its cost, the proposed scheme
requires geographical location information and strict synchronization. In [18, 19], a
learning technique based on neural networks is used to predict the sensor measure-
ments, and a reputation scheme is used to mark nodes as faulty if their reports are too
different from predictions. In [11], a protocol similar to RESIST-1 is proposed, but
without strong cryptography. As a consequence, it requires a protocol to detect mali-
cious sensors (reports are vulnerable to falsification) and to blacklist nodes (through a
complex messaging mechanism).
An interesting analysis of DDoS attacks in sensor networks, which also takes into
account different network parameters and some counter measures, is presented in [1].
While their work covers TCP JellyFish and selective-forwarding attacks, we focus on
sinkhole attacks. Moreover, our study of the Risk Factor metric captures more network
characteristics.
An intuitive approach against selective forwarding attacks is to use multipath rout-
ing [8, 6]. However, such a protocol dramatically increases communication overhead
as the redundancy of paths increases. In addition, these paths eventually converge to a
few nodes surrounding the base station where malicious nodes can have a dreadful im-
pact. Indeed, our simulation results show that the efficiency of this approach is limited,
as confirmed by [1].
Trust-based systems [17, 16, 21] are interesting approaches to deal with selective
forwarding attacks. In these systems, interactions between sensors are used for trust
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level computation. Such systems are, however, often complex. We believe resilience,
as provided by our protocols, is a better choice. As in [13], RESIST could use trust
levels in the choice of the set of nodes to be considered during the round robin proce-
dure.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a new metric, the Risk Factor, to measure the impact of
selective forwarding and sinkhole attacks on sensor networks. We showed that it suc-
cessfully captures different topology-based parameters, such as the position and num-
ber of malicious nodes, the network scale, and attacker capability. Our performance
evaluation confirmed that the resilience of our protocols is high even in the presence
of collusions. We then presented two reconfiguration protocols that increase the re-
silience of the network in the presence of sink-hole attacks: RESIST-1 prevents mali-
cious nodes from lying about their distance to the sink more than one hop; RESIST-0,
which although being more expensive to use, completely stops malicious nodes from
lying about their distance. Our performance evaluation confirmed the higher resilience
of our protocols, even in the presence of some collusion. Nevertheless, as future work,
we plan to evaluate the computation overhead of our schemes and to provide more
collusion-resistance into our protocols.
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